Cantillon Deep Value · No. 001 · Published July 23, 2026 · Revised July 25, 2026 ★ Global Overlooked ★ Corrected & Downgraded

We Downgraded Our Own Debut: NEOWIZ at Under Two Times Earnings, and Why That Still Was Not Enough

Two days after publishing our first Deep Value issue we finished building a harder research system, and the first thing it did was mark our own work. NEOWIZ went through it again, this time verified line by line against the company's own filings. Four things were wrong. Two of them make the company cheaper than we told you. Two of them break the argument we made for it. The score falls from 22 out of 25 to 16, and the rating drops from Conviction Buy to Buy. Everything below is the corrected version, with the old numbers shown next to the real ones.

⚠ Correction and downgrade · July 25, 2026

What we got wrong in the first version of this issue

On July 25 we adopted a stricter research standard that requires every thesis-critical number to be checked against the company's own filing before publication, rather than taken from free data providers. We ran the debut issue through it. It did not pass in its original form.

  1. We overstated the market value by about 31%. We reported a market cap of about ₩508 billion. The company reports 21,636,459 shares in issue. At the ₩17,930 price on publication day that is ₩387.9 billion. Our figure implied roughly 28.3 million shares, which this company has never had. This error made the stock look more expensive than it is.
  2. The buyback we described as running had already finished. We wrote that a ₩10 billion buyback was approved in May 2026 and running to November 2026. The company's own first-quarter report says the FY2025 shareholder return was ₩12 billion, split equally between a cash dividend and a share cancellation, and completed in full in April 2026. The ₩10 billion figure is the minimum floor written into the policy, not a live programme. The next return is based on 2026 profit and is payable in 2027. This was the single biggest support for our catalyst rating, and it was not there.
  3. We said the company has no meaningful analyst coverage. It has eight analysts. They carry a Buy consensus with an average twelve-month target of ₩27,750. The stock has fallen by roughly half anyway. That matters enormously, because our entire argument was that the market had not looked. It has looked. It disagrees with the timing, not the arithmetic. That is a much weaker position to be in and we have marked it down hard.
  4. We misreported 2025 net profit. We said ₩45.8 billion. The filings show ₩45.07 billion in total, or ₩49.98 billion attributable to shareholders. Small, but it is the kind of thing the new process exists to catch.

The honest summary. The company is cheaper than we told you. Once the balance sheet is properly adjusted you are paying under two times operating profit at the current price. But the reason we said it would re-rate has already happened and did not work, and the reason we said it was ignored was not true. The arithmetic was never the problem. The argument was.

We have left the original entry price of ₩17,930 in place for track-record purposes. Under our published rules an entry stands at the closing price on the day it was first published, whatever we learn afterwards. The loss on this position, if it becomes one, belongs to us.

The Setup · Why Korea, and What Has Actually Changed

About 69% of Korean listed companies still trade below book value. For decades this "Korea discount" was a trap, because family-controlled groups sat on cash they never paid out and small shareholders had no way to make them. That has genuinely changed. The government's Value-Up programme pushed companies to return cash, and a 2026 amendment to Korea's Commercial Act now forces companies to cancel the shares they buy back, within 12 months for new buybacks and 18 months for older ones. Handing cash back is no longer optional once a buyback is announced.

That much is real and we stand behind it. What we got wrong was assuming the reform automatically means a lot of cash coming back soon at any given company. It does not. It means that when a company chooses to buy back, the shares must be retired. The size of the return is still set by the company. At NEOWIZ the policy pays out the greater of 20% of operating profit or ₩10 billion a year. On this year's earnings that floor is likely to bind, which is a return of roughly 3.7% of the cash pile per year. That is a slow drip, not a forcing mechanism, and we should have said so the first time.

1 · The Thesis Cheap and Good, Catalyst Weak
The market is pricing NEOWIZ as though its games business is worth close to nothing. On verified numbers it is worth a great deal more than nothing. Strip out the adjusted cash and you are paying roughly ₩92 billion for a studio that has averaged ₩46.5 billion of operating profit over the last two years, owns one of the few Korean console games to sell well worldwide, and has six projects in development. That is under two times operating profit. The catch, which we did not state clearly enough before, is that nothing in particular forces the market to change its mind. This is a cheap asset with a slow clock, not a cheap asset with a trigger.
2 · The Business

NEOWIZ is a Korean game developer and publisher. Its standout asset is Lies of P, a Pinocchio-themed "Soulslike" action game launched in September 2023 that has sold more than 4 million copies. A prequel expansion, Overture, came out in mid-2025, and a full sequel is in development, though at an earlier stage than we implied: the company's own pipeline chart puts it at "vertical slice", which is the stage after a prototype and well before a finished game. Around that sit the long-running DJMAX rhythm series, the mobile title Brown Dust 2, the Cat & Soup franchise, the Pmang casual games portal, and a publishing arm for outside studios.

In the first quarter of 2026 revenue split 51% mobile, 39% PC and console, 10% other, and 51% overseas. Revenue grew 13.9% year on year. Operating profit was ₩6.95 billion, a 6.9% margin, down sharply from the strong quarters of 2025. The company describes this openly as a gap between releases. That is the honest state of the business: capital-light, genuinely global, and currently between hits.

3 · Why It Is Cheap Revised: It Is Not Ignored

This is the section we got most wrong, so it is worth being precise about what replaced it.

What we said: NEOWIZ is cheap because nobody has bothered to read the Korean filings.

What is true: eight analysts cover this company. They have a Buy consensus and an average twelve-month price target of ₩27,750, roughly 64% above the current price. The company publishes a full quarterly investor deck and runs an English-language investor site. Domestic Korean brokers write on it regularly. And the stock has still fallen from ₩32,000 in February to under ₩17,000 in July.

That is not a neglected company. That is a company the market has examined and decided to keep discounting anyway. The difference matters more than it might sound. A neglected stock re-rates when someone finally looks. A considered discount only closes when the reason for it goes away, and here the reason is visible: earnings are lumpy, the hit is ageing, the release gap is real, and the cash comes back slowly.

There is still a genuine structural argument, and it is the one this letter should have made. Coverage in Korean, by Korean brokers, for Korean institutions does not put a global bid under a ₩365 billion KOSDAQ stock. Global small-cap value funds do not screen this exchange by default, and at roughly $250 million it is too small for most of them to own meaningfully anyway. So the buyer who would normally arbitrage a two times earnings multiple is structurally absent. That is a real reason for a discount to persist. It is a much weaker reason to expect it to close.

4 · The Other Side The Bear Case, Argued Properly
The steelman short. You are looking at a studio whose entire equity story rests on one game that came out in 2023 and is now being milked through downloadable content while the sequel sits at vertical slice, meaning realistically 2028. Operating margin has collapsed from 20.8% in the third quarter of 2025 to 6.9%. The company is funding six simultaneous projects, which is how mid-size studios destroy cash, and its own materials admit development costs are rising globally. The cash pile is not a gift to you. It is working capital for that development programme, controlled by a holding company that sits above you. Eight analysts have published Buy ratings into a stock that has halved, which tells you the cheapness argument has already been made loudly and has not worked. Cheap Korean small caps have stayed cheap for twenty years for exactly this reason, and a policy that returns 3.7% of the cash a year does not change that arithmetic in any timeframe you care about.

Who is selling, and are they stupid? This is the weakest part of the case and we should be straight about it. We cannot identify a forced or indifferent seller. There is no index deletion, no fund liquidation, no tax-loss window driving this. The stock has fallen steadily from ₩32,000 since February on ordinary volume, which looks like considered selling by informed domestic holders reacting to the earnings gap. When the seller is informed rather than forced, the burden of proof sits with the buyer.

The Variant Perception, Restated Honestly
The market believes NEOWIZ is a fading one-hit studio whose cash is trapped behind a holding company. We believe the balance sheet is real and the operating business is worth several times what the market pays for it. But we no longer claim to know when that gap closes, because the natural buyer of a $250M KOSDAQ stock does not exist. This is now a valuation and patience thesis, not a catalyst thesis.
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What Happens Next

Publishing an idea starts the coverage, it does not end it. For this name: the annual report work to close the restricted cash, auditor and related-party lines, published by 15 August. A verified peer comparison to follow. An earnings note within 72 hours of the second-quarter results. An update on every checkpoint date whether or not anything happened. A timing alert within 24 hours if the gate moves either way. And an exit note if the thesis breaks, published whether or not it lost money.

Every position is tracked in the open in the Deep Value Portfolio, entered at the closing price on the day it was first published, under rules set in advance and not changed afterwards.

Legend
Adjusted net cash: cash and investments, minus debt, and minus anything that is not genuinely free, such as money already committed, the cash the business needs to operate, and the share belonging to minority shareholders in subsidiaries. EV (enterprise value): market value minus adjusted net cash. What you actually pay for the business itself. EV/EBIT: enterprise value divided by operating profit. Normalised: profit adjusted to a mid-cycle level rather than a peak or a trough year. NCAV: net current asset value, current assets minus all liabilities. Expected return: the probability-weighted annual return across the three scenarios. Timing gate: whether the chart says buy now, start partial, or wait. IVT: Institutional Volume Terminal, the chart overlay used in section 10. AVWAP: anchored volume-weighted average price, roughly the average price institutions have paid since a chosen starting point. SD2L Extreme: a snapback signal that fires when price is stretched unusually far below that average. Value-Up: Korea's governance reform programme. KOSDAQ: Korea's growth exchange.
Cantillon Deep Value is research and education, not investment advice. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. This issue was first published on 23 July 2026 and revised on 25 July 2026; the corrections are set out in full at the top of the page rather than edited in silently. Thesis-critical figures are verified against the company's own filings and shown in section 5. Figures that could not be verified are labelled as estimates, and the outstanding items are listed rather than glossed over. Disclosure: the author holds a position in this name, established at the original publication date, in the 1% size band. No trading takes place in a covered name within three trading days either side of publication or of a rating change. No compensation is received from any covered company. Korean small-cap stocks carry currency, liquidity and governance risks. Do your own diligence. On companies this size, the filings are the final word.