Cantillon Deep Value · 10 November 2026 ★ United States ★ Track A

Zumiez: priced for a recovery that never comes.

A skate and streetwear retailer with no borrowings, 714 stores and half its shares bought back since 2011, now 55% below its December high and priced under its tangible book value. This issue asks whether that is cheap, or just accurate.

The Conclusion, Before Anything Else
Is it cheap on adjusted, normalised figures?Members
Is the balance sheet safe enough?Members
Do the accounts survive the forensic pass?Members
Is there a catalyst with a clock?Members
Is management aligned, and will value reach minorities?Members
Is it liquid enough to enter and to leave?Members
Does it clear the return hurdle for its tier?Members
Does the thesis survive the stress test?Members
Do I hold it?Members
Current actionMembers
Nine questions, one action. The answers are members-only, because the answers are the report.
The Setup · A good year, then a bad one

At the end of January the market paid 1.27 times book value for Zumiez. Today it pays 0.81 times, after one weak summer.

Below book value for the third time in four years
Share price divided by book value per share, at each fiscal year end (late January). Now = 10 November 2026
0x0.5x1x1.5x2x2.5xFY21: 2.23x2.23xFY21FY22: 1.21x1.21xFY22FY23: 0.97x0.97xFY23FY24: 0.92x0.92xFY24FY25: 1.27x1.27xFY25Now: 0.81x0.81xNow
Source: Bigdata.com price-to-book at each fiscal year end; book value from Zumiez 10-K filings; now from the Q2 FY2026 10-Q and the 10 November price.

In December 2025 the stock reached $31.70. Two back-to-school seasons in a row had brought US comparable sales growth in the low double digits, and the market priced it as a turnaround that had arrived. It had not. In 2026 US footwear softened and fewer shoppers came through the malls. Second-quarter sales fell 2.5%, the loss widened, and the stock dropped 16% after hours on 10 September. Guidance for the third quarter is worse: sales down 5.5% to 7.2% and an operating margin of 1% to 1.7%.

The stock now trades at $14.40. The question is whether the market has overreacted to one bad summer, or finally priced a chain of mall stores for what it is.

1 · The Thesis Cheap + Good + Catalyst, Tested

The market prices Zumiez as if its margin never recovers. This issue tests whether that is too gloomy, or simply right.

Sales are back to FY2017. The margin is not
Zumiez, fiscal years to late January, FY2016 to FY2025, and the last twelve months to 1 August 2026

Sales, $M

836
927
979
1034
991
1184
958
876
889
929
933
16171819202122232425TTM

Operating margin, %

4.7
5.3
6.2
8.3
9.8
13.3
3.2
-7.4
0.2
1.8
2.2
16171819202122232425TTM
Source: Zumiez 10-K filings FY2016 to FY2025 and the Q2 FY2026 10-Q, via SEC EDGAR. FY2023 includes a goodwill write-down.
Sales are back where they were in FY2017, when the company kept 5.3 cents of every dollar as operating profit. Over the last four years it kept less than nothing on average. At today's price the business, after its cash, is valued at roughly what it earns in a bad year. So a recovery is not in the price at all. If it comes, the stock is cheap. If US malls keep emptying, it is fairly priced. The members' half puts numbers on both.
2 · The Business

A mall retailer with a healthy business abroad and a struggling one at home, and home is 83% of sales.

Abroad is growing. North America, 83% of sales, is not
Comparable sales, change on a year earlier, fiscal 2026
North AmericaQ2, 83% of sales
-2.9%
Europe and AustraliaQ2, 17% of sales
+2.1%
TotalQ2
-2.1%
TotalQ3 to Labor Day
-3.5%
TotalQ3 guidance
-5.0 to -6.5%
Source: Zumiez Q2 FY2026 results and earnings call, 10 September 2026. The faint end of the last bar shows the guided range.

Zumiez sells clothes, shoes, accessories and skate and snow gear to teenagers and young adults who follow skate, snow and street culture. It runs 714 stores: 560 in the US, 45 in Canada, 82 in Europe under the Blue Tomato name and 27 in Australia as Fast Times, plus web shops in each market. Most US stores sit in shopping malls, so sales depend on mall traffic. Growth in own-label products and in markets outside the US has kept the international business rising while the US slipped.

The economics are those of a specialty retailer: gross margin about 36%, and almost all of it consumed by store rent, wages and freight. That makes profit very sensitive to sales. A small fall in comparable sales takes most of the operating profit with it, and a small rise brings it back.

3 · Why It's Overlooked

Small, out of favour, and in a sector most funds stopped owning years ago. Meanwhile the company has quietly bought back half its shares.

Zumiez has bought back half of itself
Diluted shares outstanding, millions, fiscal years. Now = cover of the Q2 FY2026 10-Q, 29 August 2026
0M10M20M30MFY11: 31.131.1FY11FY13: 30.230.2FY13FY15: 27.727.7FY15FY17: 24.924.9FY17FY19: 25.525.5FY19FY21: 24.624.6FY21FY22: 19.419.4FY22FY24: 18.918.9FY24FY25: 17.217.2FY25Now: 15.315.3Now
Source: Zumiez 10-K filings FY2011 to FY2025 and the Q2 FY2026 10-Q, via SEC EDGAR.

At $221M of market value it is below the size most funds bother with, only a couple of brokers still publish targets, and no outside investor holds 5% or more according to the 2026 proxy. Mall retail has been a sector to avoid for a decade, and the stock is down 45% this year, which makes it a candidate for tax-loss selling in December. Management owns a real stake: chief executive Rick Brooks, in the job since 2000, holds 15.3%, and co-founder and chairman Tom Campion 4.8%.

The fair criticism: the neglect is earned. Margins have been thin or negative for four years, and the buyback, however large, was mostly done at prices well above today's. Section 4 makes the case against properly.

4 · The Other Side The Bear Case, Argued Properly

The bear case in one chart: the store leases are bigger than the company.

The store leases are bigger than the whole company
Millions of dollars. Leases and cash at 1 August 2026; market value at the 10 November price
Store lease liabilities714 stores, 4.7 years left on average
$227.2M
Market value15.33M shares at $14.40
$220.8M
Cash and securities1 Aug 2026, before the last $10.5M of buybacks
$97.3M
Source: Zumiez Q2 FY2026 10-Q, balance sheet and lease note; share count from its cover page; price from Bigdata.com.
The steelman short. Zumiez is a chain of mall stores in a decade when teenagers stopped going to malls. The ten-year average margin flatters it, because it includes the stimulus boom of 2020 and 2021; the four years since average below zero. The cash looks large in January and is much smaller by August: this summer the company drew $16.4M on its credit lines before repaying them, and it spent $40M buying back stock at about $20 a share, 40% above today's price. Against that cash sit $227M of store leases with nearly five years left to run, a fixed cost that does not shrink when traffic does. Book value is mostly inventory and store fittings, worth book only if the clothes sell at full price. And management has just guided to a third quarter with almost no profit, in the season that should be its second best.

Who is selling, and are they stupid? Mostly momentum money that bought the run to $31.70 and left after the September miss, plus earnings-revision models that follow guidance cuts. December tax-loss selling comes next. None of them is forced, and none of them is stupid: they are selling falling comparable sales. The informed holders matter more, and the chief executive and the chairman between them own a fifth of the company. They have not been sellers in the filings this issue checked.

The Variant Perception
The market believes Zumiez is a shrinking mall chain that will never again earn more than 2% on its sales. I believe the business outside the US, own-label growth and store closures can lift it to 3% or 4% within two years, and at today's price even that is worth a lot. The gap closes only if North American comparable sales stop falling. The first read is 3 December.
The Cantillon File

Zumiez, by the numbers

The numbers behind the business, from its SEC filings. The full File updates every Monday.

Business quality4.5 of 10, middling
Figures to13 November 2026
  1. Where the money comes from83 cents of every revenue dollar come from North America, down 3% on the year.
  2. Where the money goesOf every $100 of sales, $2 is left for owners once staff stock pay is counted as a cost.
  3. Who ends up with itThe share count is shrinking 3.9% a year, so each share owns a little more of the business every year.
  4. What protects itThe strongest defence is scale economies. Gross margin has been moving, within 6 points over 6 periods.
Every figure from the company's own filings.Read the full ZUMZ File →
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What Happens Next

Publishing an idea starts the coverage, it does not end it. For this name: an earnings note within 72 hours of every result, an update on each checkpoint date whether or not anything happened, a timing alert within 24 hours if the gate flips, and an exit note if the thesis breaks, published whether or not it lost money. Every position is tracked in the open in the Deep Value Portfolio under a published track record method.

Legend
Adjusted net cash: cash and investments minus total debt and minus anything that is not genuinely free (restricted cash, customer deposits, pension deficits, operating cash needs). EV (enterprise value): market value minus adjusted net cash. What you actually pay for the business. EV/EBIT: enterprise value divided by operating profit, on normalised earnings. Normalised: earnings adjusted to a mid-cycle level rather than a trough or a peak. ROIC: return on invested capital, how much profit the business makes on the money tied up in it. Expected IRR: the probability-weighted annual return across the three scenarios. Timing gate: whether the chart says buy now, start partial, or wait. IVT: Institutional Volume Terminal, the chart overlay used in section 10. AVWAP: anchored volume-weighted average price, roughly the average price institutions have paid since a chosen point. Comparable sales: sales at stores and web shops open at least a year, so new and closed stores do not distort the change. Tangible book: shareholders' equity minus goodwill and other intangible assets. Lease liabilities: the present value of the rent the company is committed to pay on its stores. Operating deleverage: when sales fall but rent and wages do not, profit falls much faster than sales. Own-label: products sold under the retailer's own brands rather than other companies'.
Cantillon Deep Value is research and education, not investment advice. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Thesis-critical figures are verified against primary filings before publication and the verification log is shown in section 5; figures that could not be verified are labelled as estimates. Disclosure: the author holds no position in Zumiez, did not hold one before publication, and will not trade it within three trading days of publication. No trading takes place in a covered name within three trading days either side of publication. No compensation is received from any covered company. Specialty retailers are highly seasonal, and a single holiday quarter can move the numbers more than the rest of the year combined. Do your own diligence. On companies this size, the filings are the final word.